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Potentially, geothermal resources are an enormous domestic energy
source. However, myriad federal, state and local regulations, which oft-times
conflict with one another, have hampered its development. Mr. McNamera
analyzes this problem in the context of the nation's present energy situation.

CONSTRAINTS ON GEOTHERMAL
DEVELOPMENT: TAX AND BEYONDt
Jack McNamera*
TAX AND SUBSIDY POLICY

Development of the nation's vast geothermal resource
base, now entering its third decade, has been painstakingly
slow and arduous. Unfortunately, much of the delay has been
man-made. Seemingly every point of contact between the
legal system and geothermal resources - and there are many
- has provided yet another roadblock and continued frustration.
Access to the vast federal lands, believed to contain nearly fifty-five percent of the potential geothermal production
areas, languished in a legislative vacuum throughout the
1960's. Mining, material and mineral leasing laws were all interpreted as inapplicable to geothermal resources. Even after
the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 ended that decade-old
stalemate, preparation of leasing and operating regulations
delayed the first competitive lease sale until January 1974,
more than three years later. A flood of noncompetitive applications then confronted an understaffed BLM and a seemingly recalcitrant Forest Service, and it was not until 1975 that
the initial "noncomp" was granted. To date, only nineteen
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percent of these applications have progressed to lease status
on BLM land, and a miniscule one and one-tenth percent on
Forest Service land. Unlike its historic treatment of mining
and mineral leasing within the National Forests, Congress
chose, inexplicably, to give the Service veto power over geothermal development therein, rather than entrusting it solely
to Interior.
Federal tax policy was similarly ignorant of geothermal's
existence throughout the 1960's and congressional reaction
to requests for inclusion of geothermal under current expensing and other advantages has consistently been an unending
chorus of "it's for the courts to decide." In this crucial area,
IRS has emerged as the sole policy maker, and their stance
has, quite predictably, been a hostile one. Only the impetus
of Jimmy Carter's National Energy Plan seems to have moved
Congress to act in this area but the outcome, and its impact,
remains in doubt nonetheless.
And while federal tax and mineral disposal policies failed
to encourage (or actively discouraged) geothermal development, many other areas of federal and state law were all too
inclusive. Western state legislatures, conscious of the long tradition of water rights warfare between themselves and Washington, were loathe to let federal geothermal leaseholders begin what they feared might become a wholesale depletion of
already over-committed groundwater reservoirs. They therefore placed geothermal operations under the aegis of their respective water engineers, and multinational oil companies
soon found themselves applying for waterdrilling licenses.
County planning departments, particularly in California,
felt that they had to grant use permits before any drilling
could take place in order to keep a handle on local land use.
Tax assessors, both state and local, saw a possible new
source of revenue and spewed forth a multitude of conflicting interpretations.
State and federal wildlife and environmental agencies, unsure of the new resource's impact, rushed in to study, monitor and gauge.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss1/10
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State utility commissions and siting councils fought with
county and local authorities for the last word on power plant
sitings.
Federal, state and private deeds containing "mineral reservations" became a fertile litigational seedbed. Was geothermal a "mineral", "water" ("animal", "vegetable")? - no one
seemed to know and each interpretation soon entered the
timeless warp of the legal system - apparently (to the hardpressed developers) never to return. All the while, development of a new, potentially enormous domestic energy source
fell farther behind, trapped in the interstices of this legal and
institutional maze.
What made this situation all the more lamentable was
that, even in the absence of these man-made problems, geothermal still has to overcome some serious natural and technological problems. The faults of the earth seemingly concealed problems rivaling those in the tax code. Of the four
basic geothermal resource types - dry steam, hot water, geopressured zones and hot dry rocks - only the first, containing far less than one percent of the total resource base, is
presently a technologically proven, economically competitive
fuel. Research into the bulk of geothermal's potential was, of
course, being carried on by various government and private
entities. But as with all research into alternative energy
sources, the low cost of the marginal, competing source (oil)
put a damper on most of these activities throughout the
1960's.
Not until the OPEC price escalation and the OAPEC embargo of October 1973 hiked this price skyward was any
sense of urgency put into these efforts. Nevertheless, the low
cost of coal and nuclear fuel in many areas throughout the
West and the proven nature of those technologies continue to
dog wide-scale adoption of geothermal-based power by the
largest electric systems and industrial users.
In 1974 ERDA sprang, full-blown, from congressional
frustration over oil prices, and with it the Division of Geothermal Energy (DGE). DGE was handed the challenging task
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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of uniting the diverse research programs already in existence
and supplementing them in any way necessary to reach an
arbitrarily-selected National Geothermal Goal of replacing
one million barrels of oil a day by 1985.
DGE found out quickly that, despite a wide range of
highly publicized "estimates," no one really knew what the
nation's geothermal potential actually was. So, in cooperation with the United States Geological Survey, they began a
national Geothermal Resource Assessment Program. In July
1975, the Geological Survey published their initial findings
(Circular 726). Though very conservative in approach, the
Survey had nonetheless found already identified systems capable of equalling 140 Hoover Dams or nuclear plants. As
DGE found out, however, private sector exploratory activity
was (as opposed to feverish attempts at lease acquisition) less
than optimal for achieving their 1985 "target." As many
deep wells had been drilled outside of The Geysers before
1970 as since that date. True, many of the post-1970 tests
were far deeper and more expensive than their earlier counterparts, but the exploratory drilling pace was simply too laggard to meet even drastically scaled down (i.e., reasonable)
goals for geothermal-based capacity. This situation, coupled
with the natural reticence of the utility systems, was making
a joke out of any estimates for geothermal potential. "Geothermal development" would become a curious still-life unless a tremendous amount of deephole exploration and testing could be stimualted.
Traditionally, natural resource assessment on federal (as
well as state and private lands), has been performed by the
private sector. Without entering into the already-lively debate
as to the wisdom of this policy, it is an irrefutable fact that
this sector's historic level of activity has not been forthcoming in geothermal. Although the vagaries of land access and
permitting hang ups have contributed mightily to this state of
affairs, the largest single deterrent at present is federal tax
treatment of geothermal exploratory expenditures. Geothermal developers have been denied the IRR-boosting tax provisions available to other fuel developers, namely the option to
currently expense most costs and a non-cost related deduchttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss1/10
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tion from production income. The current expensing benefits, e.g., have been granted to oil and gas developers since
1917, first by administrative regulation and only belatedly
(1953) by statute. Congress has not, as yet, chosen to extend
them to geothermal, though it has seen fit to assist those who
wish to develop ball clay, bromine, fullers earth, oyster shells,
ornamental stone, sand, mica, and flake granite. The seriousness of this implicit policy decision cannot be overstated.
As Chief Counsel for the Geothermal Energy and the Law
Project at the University of Southern California Law Center,
I have had an opportunity to examine the impact of this curious tax policy decision in a rather detailed fashion. Using
data gathered from various industry and governmental sources,
I created a model hot-water geothermal project - from preliminary geological and geophysical "weeding out" and leasing through exploratory and developmental drilling to final
production. This expenditure data and no less than a dozen
possible federal tax treatments were then run through a computer, along with different price, financing and ownership
structures, in order to guage the impact of each of the various
tax regimes upon the project's economic viability. The full
study will be published later this year, but I feel at liberty to
state that, in the absence of more favorable tax treatments
(currently expensing, either alone or in concert with fifteen
percent or twenty-two percent percentage depletion) or their
equivalent (some form of cost-sharing by government), there
is a dramatic downward impact on a geothermal project's internal rate of return, regardless of the mill price and financial
leveraging being utilized. Though this outcome was not surprising, the extent of the shift did come as something of a
shock. Plainly, if hot water geothermal systems are to make
any contribution to the nation's energy needs, it will be difficult if not impossible to imagine them doing so in the absence of a more favorable investment climate.fIn other words,
given the present unfavorable federal tax treatment the necessity for enactment of tax incentives or some other sort of
geothermal financial subsidy seems clear.
Large policy questions remain, however, as to what form
that bolstering should take, as well as its extent, duration,
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etc. These issues are also being examined by the USC Law
Center Project, under the direction of Professor Christopher
D. Stone and myself. I would like at this time to venture
some preliminary, personal observations on these points before moving on to what I consider to be larger and more farreaching policy dilemma confronting geothermal development.
There are several possible forms that a geothermal exploration/development incentive (or subsidy if you will) might
take. Direct grants, loans, loan guarantees, some mode of
price supports, favorable tax treatment - these will not exhaust the creative mind in this area, though surely they would
be the major areas studied. Of this group, tax incentives seem
to possess several major advantages.
First of all, they would incur virtually no direct additional administrative costs, while the others would all require untold increments of red tape, bureaucracy, and therefore delay.
They also have the virtue of open-endedness. A tax break is
an offer to perform a certain given activity. It neither mandates nor forbids individual action. If a developer opts for exploration on federal lands, there is also a strong basis in
equity since tax incentives amount to a forty-eight percent
cost-sharing of exploratory risks by the federal government.
Properly framed, they would spur geothermal development at
the front end, where it is most needed and has the most dramatic impact.
A strong argument could also be made for enactment of
at least some of the proposed geothermal tax incentives as an
equalizing factor, rather than any subsidy. They would actually bring treatment of this highly capital-intensive natural resource industry more in line with that of business as a whole.
Recent research on my part has found that, at least in oil and
gas, both integrated and producer firms pay tax at a higher
rate than "manufacturing" entities. The impact of increased
investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation schedules
on these supposedly "normal" tax-paying firms must not be
forgotten.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss1/10
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Or one could point to the necessity of constantly exploring for new productive areas, which are by definition less accessible and higher cost and the wisdom, therefore, of increasing cash flows to further this activity. (Of course certain
restrictions on use of tax-driven funds might be necessary to
insure such a "plowback").
On the negative side, our preliminary work also shows
that tax incentives yield the highest benefits to the most affluent individuals and corporations. The taxes so "forgiven"
must be made up by other, less well-off individuals. There is
also the plain fact that, once enacted, a tax subsidy calcifies
and resists repeal even when it has long outlived the original
rationale justifying its creation.
In addition, large companies with funds internally generated from other endeavors will be big beneficiaries of any
new tax treatment. Not only integrated oil companies, but
mining, gas pipelines, utility, chemical, paper, metal and oil
producing firms with large, non-geothermal cash flows will
utilize the write-offs particularly in the near term. Small firms
trying to put together limited partnership drilling programs
with affluent individuals as the limited liability partners face
increasing investor scepticism on all public drilling programs.
Surely some will survive and even prosper but, as in oil, the
bulk of the exploratory investment will be large firm-generated.
Trying to balance these competing arguments is difficult.
But at bottom, and aside from its obvious necessity, some
form of geothermal subsidy, tax or otherwise, seems justified.
Development of an indigenous, non-exportable energy source
for electrical generation, space and process heating purposes
is clearly in the national interest.
Each 110 megawatts of geothermal-based generating capacity saves $145 million in imported oil costs annually. Utilization of significant numbers of geothermal systems would
therefore have a startingly positive impact on our balance of
payments deficit.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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Freeing up domestic oil and natural gas for more efficient
end uses - another bonus from geothermal utilization - not
only increases their already slipping and decidedly precious
supply but "matches" the relatively low quality geothermal
fuel with electricity generation or direct applications - processes where most heat is inevitably wasted anyway. This
"matching" type of energy conservation (rather than simple
demand reduction) is often underestimated by energy planners but offers attractive possibilities.
Given the high concentration of potential geothermal
areas in the Western states, utilization of this new fuel could
also accelerate the inevitable and necessary creation of a West
to East energy delivery system, supplying domestic fuels of
all kinds to areas of greatest need - and ones currently exhibiting largest dependence upon foreign oil.
Certainly we should keep in mind, as well, the long history of federal subsidies to other energy fuels when reaching
any bottom line on geothermal tax treatment, price supports,
etc. No energy fuel has ever been forced to make its way into
the marketplace without federal assistance. E.g., oil and gas
have had some form of depletion since the first income tax
law (1913), and percentage depletion since 1926. Current expensing of the intangible costs of both successful and dry
holes has been allowed them (by an administrative Treasury
decision initially), since 1917. Coal and other minerals picked
up percentage depletion in 1930.
The domestic oil and gas industries have been protected
by the federal Connally Hot Oil Act and the federally-approved state prorationing cartel since the early 1930's and by
oil import quotas betweeri 1959 and 1973.
State Department aid to United States firms engaged in
foreign production (including the institution of foreign tax
credits and an embargo of Iran in the early 1950's) must be
included here as well. In fact, State's considered acquiescence
in OPEC's initial muscle-flexing during the winter of 1970-71
and its passivity in the face of the October 1973 price hikes
should also be seen in a same light. While the firms involved
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss1/10
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may publicly disagree, their large profit increases (and those
of all energy investors) over the past several of OPEC-equivalent prices may have been the largest subsidy of all.
Nuclear may have been the most heavily subsidized fuel
of all, from massive research and development efforts and
federal enrichment facilities to the Price-Anderson Act. These
continue to this day.
The synthetic fuels industry is asking for six to eight billion dollars in assorted federal subsidies and may soon be
granted that amount, on top of increased research and development.
Solar heating, cooling and electric technologies will certainly be the recipient of large investment tax credits in the
Ninety-Fifth Congress, while that same body has doubled
ERDA's requests for solar expenditure several years in a row.
In the face of this litany, geothermal's treatment seems
almost incredible. For example, if Treasury's Office of Tax
Analysis is opposed, on principle, to current expensing of intangible development well costs and any species of percentage depletion, it should bite the bullet and propose to Congress the complete repeal of Sections 613, 616 and 263 of
the IRS Code. No doubt quite a bit of support could be generated for such a move. But to use geothermal as a whipping
boy for their half-century of frustrations in this regard disgraces the seriousness of their policy concerns. It is also reminiscent of Interior's behavior in the 1960's, when it tried to
impose upon geothermal policies which the oil, gas and mining industries had successfully fought off for years. I must admit quite frankly that I have quite a bit of sympathy for both
departments' positions, when viewed in historical context.
But their recent actions seem to be motivated by vengeance
for past wounds and a conditioned response to the presence
of large oil companies in geothermal. Again, if Treasury or
Forest Service, etc., believes in horizontal divestiture, let
them support the already-strong feeling in Congress and perhaps in the White House for such a measure. To try to achieve
a similar result through the "back door" of land or tax policy
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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only feeds the perversity that has continuously made of our
myriad of energy related policies such an irrational jumble.
BEYOND TAX AND SUBSIDY POLICY:
THE "LAND USE" DILEMMA

But let us assume for the moment that Congress enacts
some level of percentage depletion and current expensing of
intangible exploration and development costs in the current
session, as I believe it will. Treasury will have been overridden, as Interior was before it. Certainly there will be a
sharp increase in geothermal exploration. But will geothermal
development accelerate to the level all believe is desirable? I
doubt it.
A less tractable constraint will still remain. It is one which
hampers not just geothermal, but all energy fuels and projects
to distribute or utilize them, including those with favorable
tax treatment. It would be a shame if the brouhaha over geothermal taxes, like that over access to public lands before it,
obscured this more basic, all-encompassing problem. And
that is this: there is no coordinated, energy-environmental
policy decision-making process in the United States. No one
seeks to assimilate and integrate the diverse and conflicting
values of environmentalists, consumers, energy producers,
regions and government agencies. This is seen most clearly
when "land-use" decisions must be made in order to allow
extraction of a fuel or its utilization.
In this policy vacuum, every entity, whether public or
private, from local zoning commissions and tax assessors to
multinational oil companies and giant privately-owned utilities, is scrambling for its own personal solution. Each is looking out for its own interests - and nothing else. Despite what
Adam Smith and his disciples would predict - the optimal
energy future of the United States does not add up to the
sum of its individual actor's favorite fantasies. The examples
of self-seeking, non-coordinated energy conduct are so numerous as to defy cataloguing, but I would like to note briefly
some of the more damaging ones.
In geothermal alone, one could point to the duplicative
and unnecessary EIR/EIS procedures which must be suffered

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss1/10
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before seemingly any action can take place. Relevant agencies
squabble over responsibility for approving geothermal-based
utility plants and even single wells.
States and the federal government continue their centurylong war over water-rights, and the developer must enter the
byzantine state water rights maze to secure sufficient assurance that his geothermal fluid production will not be enjoined
by local ranchers.
Some developers refuse to join Phillips Petroleum's
Roosevelt Hot Springs unit, hoping for a better deal and a
free ride from those who drill. Others evade the acreage limits
by the use of individual trusts. The list goes on, nor by any
means is this ad hoc irrationality confined to geothermal.
Prudhoe Bay has spawned more than one example, with the
State of Alaska, the Native Corporations and the multinational oil firms squabbling over each's rights.
California is contributing to the Alaskan oil irrationality
as well. Standard Oil of Ohio, owner of half the Prudhoe Bay
reserves, wants to refine and sell their share in the Midwestern
United States. They have chosen a Long Beach, California to
Midland, Texas pipeline route, utilizing a converted natural
gas line for most of that distance and constructing extensions
at both ends and a tanker terminal in Long Beach Harbor.
The California Energy Commission and Air Resources Board
are steadfastly opposed to the terminal siting, predicting a
potentially "immense" adverse impact on Southern California's already poor air quality. Though their claims are
strong ones, their "alternative" is the same as the oil producers - sell it to the Japanese. California doesn't need Alaskan
oil, they reason, so let the rest of the country fend for itself,
paying a higher price for ever greater imports.
These instances are merely the tip of the iceberg. The list
goes on and on. Despite all the ink being spilled over "Energy
Policy", and the tidal wave of reports, analyses and position
papers, the present United States energy area most closely resembles the law of the jungle or the cave, rather than a rational
and conscious balancing of local, regional and national values.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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As with the more notorious policy problems that have
beset geothermal, the mind of man has succeeded only in institutionally balkanizing a situation which nature itself had
rendered difficult. Natural resources are not distributed on a
uniform per capita basis either, nationally or internationally.
Desert-like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have the most oil but
few people, as do the Arctic and deepest parts of our great
oceans. By constructing a world-wide distribution system and
rationalizing this disparate dispersal of supply and demand, a
few large private oil companies, assisted by the United States
and British state departments, managed for years to mask this
problem. They made all the "land use" decisions and "value
trade-offs" in a few New York and London boardrooms. But
they are no longer in charge.
Nor is it just Venezuelans, Saudis and Libyans who have
short-circuited their arrangements. Britain, Norway, Canada
and even the United States have been rocked by demands for
greater public control over energy decision making. The
strongest and most irresistible historical force now at large in
the world is democracy and its most graphic current manifestation is the struggle for popular local control over the use of
the energy resources of the earth. No one, from the most affluent leaders of OPEC or OAPEC to the lowest city or county Planning Department, wants to have decisions which so
abruptly and thoroughly affect their lives made by "outside"
entities over whom they have no control. The "enemy" is
thus easy to spot - anyone who tries to impose their will unilaterally, whether it be from the White House or the Exxon
boardroom, an international bank or state capital. The powerful forces which rationalized and integrated energy supply
and demand worldwide for half a century have been brought
to a halt by what must appear to them to be surprisingly minimal opposition.
Nor is the opposition without weapons. Federal and state
environmental legislation and other forms of legal challenge
now exist, and planning is no longer the private preserve of
industry and its "regulators." The energy companies and the
federal bureaucracy have not yet fully comprehended the intellectual and political basis for the constant round of chalhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss1/10
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lenges they face. This lack of understanding is as responsible
for the oft-furious oppostion to energy proposals in Lake
County, as it was for the formation of OPEC seventeen years
ago.
Many of the past decade's delayed or cancelled energy
projects would no doubt have been saved had their proponents actively sought out local opinion, however contrary, at
the earliest planning stages and incorporated local values into
their proposals. Quite frankly, some facilities would have
clearly been quashed by such consultations. And perhaps that
is the way it should be, since no one value is supreme. In a
democratic society some consensus must be reached as to the
desirability of heavily impacting projects. Failure to recognize
this will mean that energy activities of every description will
continue to be disrupted, delayed, blunted and strangled in
"red tape."
From the standpoint of geothermal development this situation is even more ominous, for this new resource is in a vulnerable, formative stage. What can be done to break the stalemate? Is it possible to reconcile the divergent energy interests
within the localities, states and regions of the United States?
It could well be that the most helpful and perhaps least
expensive subsidy that the federal government could give to
geothermal developers would be the reconciliation and reordering of the complex knot of conflicting values and attendant procedures which perpetually harass them.
The State of California is currently attempting to perform
this function within its jurisdiction. A State Task Force on
Geothermal Resources, of which the author is a public member, has prepared a draft of its approach to untangling, or at
least partially leveling, the "paper mountain." Perhaps its efforts will be duplicated at the federal level, where the Interagency Geothermal Coordinating Council has formed a Task
Force on Permitting.
Doubtless some areas will opt to prevent geothermal development. But many more will choose to accept it and delinPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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eate clear procedures to be followed. That will truly be a victory for all of us. But if it is not done, passage of favorable
tax legislation, like the creation of DGE and the enactment
of federal geothermal leasing and loan guarantee programs,
will be a hollow victory indeed.
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